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MORAL EVILS V. HEALTH AND SAFETY
EVILS: THE CASE OF AN OVUM
“OBTAINED” FROM A “DONOR” AND
USED BY THE “DONOR” IN HER OWN
SURROGATE PREGNANCY
Pamela M. White*
This paper critically examines the amendment made in
2012 to section 10(2)(c) of the Assisted Human
Reproduction Act, 2004 mandating the screening and
testing of “obtained” ovum “donated” by a “donor” and
*
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spaces. Her publications focussing on surrogacy highlight Canada’s
lack of empirical data on the practice and its outcomes. Attempts to
locate information reveals that Canada is an emerging hub for
international surrogacy.
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used in her own surrogate pregnancy. The amendment at
section 10(1) of the Act cites the federal government’s
obligation to reduce harm to human health and safety
arising from use of sperm or ova for human reproduction,
including the risk of disease transmission. This paper
argues that the amendment mandating the screening and
testing of surrogate ova when used by the surrogate in her
own surrogate pregnancy creates a dangerous liminal
regulatory space; one that transforms the surrogate into a
third-party donor yet she incurs no health and safety risk
to herself as she is the recipient of her own ova embryo.
Genetic implications for the surrogate-born child makes a
stronger case in support of mandatory testing, however the
amendment imposes no similar screening and testing
regime on the usual category of traditional surrogates:
women who bear genetically-related children conceived
through artificial insemination (IUI) rather than IVF. The
paper questions the application of a health and safety evil
that the amendment seeks to address. It suggests the real
evil is a moral one whereby criminal code sanctions are
being employed to discourage traditional surrogacy when
practiced as a result of assisted reproduction techniques.
INTRODUCTION
One of the many criticisms levelled at Canada’s Assisted
Human Reproduction Act, 2004 has been its lack of
regulatory certainty. By early 2018, only one set of
regulations, the Section 8 (Consent) Regulations, had been
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passed.1 Ethicists,2 lawyers3 and clinicians4 have
repeatedly called on the federal government to take
legislative action to update Canada’s 1998 human sperm
screening and testing regulation,5 address the lack of health
protections for patients using donated ova,6 and bring
clarity to the law regarding reimbursement of gamete
donors and surrogates.7
1

SOR/2007-137, s 8 [Section 8 (Consent) Regulations].

2

Françoise Baylis, Jocelyne Downie & David Snow, “Fake it Till You
Make it: Policy Making and Assisted Human Reproduction in Canada”
(2015) 36:6 J Obstetricians & Gynecologists Can 510: 512; Jocelyne
Downie & Francoise Baylis, “Transnational Trade in Human Eggs:
Law, Policy, and (In)action in Canada” (2013) 41:1 JL Med & Ethics
224 at 239; Alana Cattapan, “Rhetoric and reality: Protecting Women
in Canadian Public Policy on Assisted Human Reproduction” (2013)
25:2 CJWL 202.

3

Erin Nelson, Law, Policy and Reproductive Autonomy (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2013) at 326–34.

4

Kelly Crowe “Test Imported Human Eggs, Doctors Urge”, CBC News
(29 April 2012), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/health/test-importedhuman-eggs-doctors-urge-1.1207174>.

5

Stu Marvel, “'Tony Danza is My Sperm Donor?': Queer Kinship and
the Impact of Canadian Regulations around Sperm Donation” (2013)
25:2 CJWL 221 at 221.

6

Vanessa Gruben, “Women as Patients, Not as Spare Parts: Examining
the Relationship Between the Physician and Women Egg Providers”
(2013) 25:2 CJWL 249 at 249–50.

7

Alison Motluk “The Human Egg Trade: How Canada’s Fertility Laws
Are Failing Donors, Doctors, and Parents”, The Walrus (April 2010),
online: <thewalrus.ca/category/issues/2010-04/>; Alison Motluk,
“First Prosecution under Assisted Human Reproduction Act Ends in
Conviction” (2014) 186:2 CMAJ E75; R v Picard and Canadian
Fertility Consulting Ltd, (2013) unreported, available online at:
<cdn.dal.ca/content/dam/dalhousie/pdf/sites/noveltechethics/AHRA_
Facts.pdf>.

58

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

The tide, however, appears to be turning. On
September 30, 2016, Health Canada announced its
intention to affirm and clarify several regulations listed in
the Assisted Human Reproductive Act 2004 (AHRA). 8 It
plans to revise the 1996 Semen Regulations and move them
from the Food and Drugs Act to the AHRA (2012); develop
regulations for the screening and testing of ova donors;
establish gamete tracing protocols; clarify reimbursable
expenses for parties involved in surrogacy arrangements
and sperm and ova donation; and institute inspection
procedures.9
Since the 2016 announcement, Health Canada has
engaged in web-based consultations and invited
stakeholders and interested parties to comment on its
proposed pathways for regulatory change. Consultation has
occurred alongside the Standards Council of Canada’s redevelopment and re-release in late 2017 of a revised
National Standard of Canada, CAN/CSA-Z900.2.1.-17
Tissues For Assisted Reproduction.10 This updated
8

Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA].

9

SOR/96-254 [Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted
Conception Regulations]; Health Canada, News Release,
“Government of Canada plans to introduce regulations to support the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (30 September 2016), online:
<www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/news/2016/09/governmentcanada-plans-introduce-regulations-support-assisted-humanreproduction-act.html>; Canada Gazette, Government Notice, 150:40,
“Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (1 October 2016), online:
<www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2016/2016-10-01/html/notice-aviseng.html#ne1>.

10

Standards Council of Canada, CAN/CSA-Z900-17 Tissues for Assisted
Reproduction, Ottawa: SCC, 2017 at 8 [2017 Can/CSA].
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Standard is a propriety set of guidelines, though it should
be noted that its development, like that of its predecessors,
was funded by Health Canada.11 It has been expected that
the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard would shape the screening,
testing, labelling, packaging, and reimbursement
regulations likely to be tabled in the 2018-19 Parliamentary
Session.12
In early February 2018, Health Canada released a
short overview report entitled: “What We Heard”.13 It
summarized the “57 sets of comments” received during the
2016–17 consultation period but did not reveal the
direction that the government was likely to take in response
to identified concerns.14 Nor did it suggest how conflicting
11

Ibid. In January 2018, the cost for the standard was $165.00 plus HST.
This cost provides the purchaser with an independent licence to access
the Standard. The purchaser is also entitled to obtain updates.

12

Ibid. It should be noted that the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard also includes
an itemization of the legitimate expenses for which gamete donors and
surrogates should receive reimbursement; Health Canada, Draft
Directive: Health Canada, Directive: Technical Requirements for
Therapeutic Donor Insemination, Ottawa: Health Canada, 2018,
online:
<www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultationassisted-human-reproduction-regulations/technical-directive.html#c>,
will be incorporated by reference; See:
Mark C McCleod,
“Reimbursement of Expenditures and Possible Sub-delegation of the
Assisted Human Reproduction Regulations” in Surrogacy in Canada:
Critical Perspectives in Law and Policy (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018)
for an explanation of how incorporation by reference will be
accomplished.

13

Health Canada, What We Heard Report: A Summary of Feedback from
the Consultation: Toward a Strengthened Assisted Human
Reproduction Act (12 January 2018) [Health Canada, What We Heard].

14

Ibid at 1.
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views might be addressed.15 On September 27, 2018,
Health Canada published in the Canada Gazette the long
awaited draft Assisted Reproduction Act Regulations
regarding Administration and Enforcement of the Act;
Reimbursement of Expenditures under subsection 12(1) of
the Act; Regulations Amending the Assisted Human
Reproduction (Section 8 Consent) Regulations; Safety of
Sperm and Ova Regulations and Draft Health Canada
Directive: Technical Requirements for Conducting the
Suitability Assessment of Sperm and Ova Donors.16
Though not the explicit topic of this paper, the 2018
proposed Regulations and Draft Directive differ in
important ways from the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard.17
These differences along with non-acceptance of proposals
for the reimbursement of gamete donors and surrogates for
example submitted during the initial phase of the
regulatory consultation can no doubt be expected to be
15

Ibid.

16

Canada Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, “Safety of Sperm and
Ova Regulations” at 3637–734; Canada Gazette, Proposed
Regulations, 152:43, “Reimbursement Related to Assisted Human
Reproduction Regulations” at 3735–40; Canada Gazette, Proposed
Regulations, 152:43, “Regulations on the Administration and
Enforcement of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act” at 3741–44;
Canada Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, “Regulations
Amending the Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8 Consent)
Regulations”
at
3745–51,
online:
<www.gazette.gc.ca/rppr/p1/2018/2018-10-27/html/index-eng.html>; Health Canada, Draft
Directive: Technical Requirements for Conducting the Suitability
Assessment of Sperm and Ova Donors, Ottawa: Health Canada, 2018,
online:
<www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultationassisted-human-reproduction-regulations/technical-directive.html#c>.

17

Compare, for example, the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard for
Reimbursement of Sperm and Ova donors and surrogates and the 2018
Proposed Regs.
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raised during the second phase of consultations scheduled
for late 2018 and early 2019.18
While such initiatives indicate that the federal
government has finally decided to take-action to resolve
some of the longstanding AHRA regulatory inadequacies,
the approach falls short of the extensive legislative renewal
advocated for by those seeking changes to the sections that
ban commercial surrogacy and gamete donation and limit
research.19 Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the
legal and policy implications of the amendments made to
the AHRA in 2012.20
This paper critically examines section 10 of the
2012 AHRA amendment and Health Canada’s proposed
regulatory response. In particular, the paper focusses on the
amendment made to section 10(2)(c) of the AHRA
mandating the screening and testing of “obtained” ovum
“donated” by a “donor” and used in her own surrogate

18

Health Canada, Consultation on Proposed Assisted Human
Reproduction Regulations, Ottawa: Health Canada, 2018, online:
<www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-assistedhuman-reproduction-regulations.html>.

19

Canadian Fertility & Andrology Society, “CFAS Position Statement:
Compensation for Third Party Reproduction in Canada” (May 2017)
and update provided May 2018, online: <www.cfas.ca/publicaffairs/position-statements/>; Alison Motluk, “Fertility Advocates
Protest Criminal Sanctions in Assisted Reproduction Act” (2018) 190:2
CMAJ E58–E59.

20

Alana Cattapan & Sara Cohen, “The Devil We Know: The
Implications of Bill C-38 for Assisted Human Reproduction in
Canada” (2013) 35:7 J Obstet Gynaecol Can 654 at 654–56.
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pregnancy.21 The stated rationale for the amendment at
section 10 cites the federal government’s obligation to
reduce harm to human health and safety arising from use
of sperm or ova for human reproduction, including the risk
of disease transmission.22 Indeed, one of the stated
objectives of the 2016 Health Canada legislative renewal
initiative acknowledges the need to “reduce the risk to
human health and safety from using donor sperm and eggs
(ova), including the risk of transmitting disease.”23 This
paper argues that the amendment mandating the screening
and testing of surrogate ova when used by the surrogate in
her own surrogate pregnancy creates a dangerous liminal
regulatory space; one that transforms the surrogate into a
third-party donor yet she incurs no health and safety risk to
herself as she is the recipient of her own ova embryo.
Moreover, the amendment imposes a screening and testing
regime that is not mandated for the usual category of
traditional surrogates: women who bear genetically-related
children conceived through artificial insemination (IUI)
rather than IVF.
In advancing this argument, the paper identifies
three issues raised by the 2012 AHRA amendment and 2018
proposed Regulations targeting traditional surrogacy when
carried out as a result of IVF assisted reproduction
21

Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c-19, s 714
[Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act].

22

Ibid, section 10(1) as amended by Jobs, Growth and Long-term
Prosperity Act; AHRA supra note 8.

23

Health Canada, Public Consultation, “Strengthening the Assisted
Human Reproduction Act” (26 January 2018), online:
<www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-assistedhuman-reproduction.html>.
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technologies.24 The first issue is that failure to screen and
test a woman’s obtained ovum used in her own surrogate
pregnancy carries criminal penalties. The Supreme Court
of Canada (SCC) decision in Reference re Assisted Human
Reproduction Act (Ref re AHRA) permits the federal
government to legislate in areas where a “health evil” is
present.25 The paper investigates the assumed “health evil”
that requires the application of federal criminal law powers
to mandate screening and testing of an “obtained” ovum
“donated” by a woman and used in her own surrogate
pregnancy.26 It asks the following question: Can we be
satisfied that the amendment meets the harm test for
application of criminal law powers established by the SCC
in Ref re AHRA?27 It looks to the proposed 2018 regulations
for guidance regarding the screening and testing regime to
be mandated for this unique type of “donated” ova.
The second issue concerns the term “donor”.
Terminological confusion created by the AHRA is
compounded by the use of a different definition of donor
24

Traditional surrogates are genetically related to the child if they agree
to carry for intended parent(s). They supply their own ova used in their
surrogate pregnancy. Most traditional surrogacy occurs as a result of
assisted insemination. The amendment is directed at IVF treatments
whereby the surrogate’s ovum (ova) are obtained as a result of ovarian
stimulation. The ex utero ovum would then be fertilized using sperm
from the intended parent or by sperm obtained for the reproductive use
of the intended parent(s).

25

Ubaka Ogbogu, “The Assisted Human Reproduction Act Reference
and the Thin Line Between Health and Crime” (2013) 22:1 Const
Forum Const 93 at 93–97.

26

AHRA, supra note 8, s 10(2)(c).

27

Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61, [2010]
3 SCR 457 at paras 13–14 [Ref Re AHRA].
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by the 2017 Canadian Standards Association Standard,
provincial statutes, Canadian Fertility and Andrology
Society treatment guidance documents, and 2018 proposed
Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations. The paper argues
that confusion over the term “donor” contributes to a
misunderstanding regarding the health and safety risks
encountered by a woman using her own “obtained” ova in
her own surrogate pregnancy. The paper critically explores
the implications of this confusion for reproductive law and
policy.
The third issue raised by the amendment centres on
the legal transformation of a traditional surrogate who
undergoes ovarian stimulation and IVF reproductive
treatments. The paper argues that the transformation occurs
in part due to confusion over the word “donor” alongside
the multi-faceted fertility treatment roles taken on by a
traditional surrogate which result in her being both an “egg
donor” and a “surrogate”. The paper asserts that law and
practice transform her into a legal liminal figure. Her
status, as Turner who expounded on the concept of
liminality explained, becomes being in “betwixt and
between positions assigned and arranged by law, custom,
convention and ceremony.”28 It is this in-between status
that presents confusion about health and safety risks,
compromises her autonomy to make decisions about the
use of her “obtained” ova and her treatment as a fertility

28

Victor Witter Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure
(Lewis and Henry Morgan Lectures), (New York: Aldine Transaction,
1969) at 95.
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patient, and leads to her being viewed as a “spare part”29
provider and as a “treatment option” for infertile patients
and intended parent(s).30
To analyse these three substantive issues, the first
section of this paper will review Canada’s assisted
reproduction legal landscape. It examines the AHRA
definition of “donor” and considers how the AHRA
definition differs from the terminology used in in
provincial statutes, the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard, CFAS
reproductive treatment guidelines, and the 2018 proposed
AHRA regulations. The paper also chronicles the
amendments made to the AHRA in 2012 that require
screening and testing of human reproductive tissue used in
fertility treatments and explore a number of implications of
the amendment in regard to consent, reproductive
autonomy, and health risks.
Having established the legislative parameters of the
AHRA amendments, the second section of the paper
analyses the health and safety harms that could be viewed
as conditions sufficient to require the imposition of
criminal law sanctions if untested and unscreened
“obtained” traditional surrogate ova are used in the
traditional surrogate’s pregnancy. I seek to establish
29

Vanessa Gruben, “Assisted Reproduction Without Assisting OverCollection: Fair Information Practices and the Assisted Human
Reproduction Agency of Canada” (2009) 17 Health LJ 225 at 229.

30

Pamela M White, “‘Why We Don’t Know What We Don’t Know’
About Canada’s Surrogacy Practices and Outcomes” in Surrogacy in
Canada: Critical Perspectives in Law and Policy, Vanessa Gruben,
Alana Cattapan & Angela Cameron eds (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018) 51
at 72–73 [White, “Why We Don’t Know”].
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whether the health and safety harms would be to the
traditional surrogate herself, the clinic, other fertility
patients, surrogate-born child, or to society more broadly.
The paper will examine if the identified health and safety
harms meet the criminal law test set out by the SCC in Ref
re AHRA. It is worth recalling that in Ref re AHRA, Justices
LeBel and Deschamps took the view that not all public
health risks should be addressed through criminal law in
declaring that “. . . it must be found that there is an evil to
be suppressed or prevented. . . .”31
The final section of the paper analyses several
problems identified with the amendment, including
whether a sufficient health and safety justification exists to
impose criminal code penalties in cases where unscreened
and untested “obtained” ova “donated” by a traditional
surrogate are used in her own surrogate pregnancy. This
section examines whether the proposed regulatory actions
function as a thinly disguised attempt to discourage the
practice of traditional surrogacy when undertaken using
IVF. The paper posits that the legislated screening and
testing requirements render traditional surrogates a special
group of reproductive patients. It places them in a
dangerous liminal legal reproductive space that potentially
exposes them to risky practices.
To conclude, the paper highlights a number of
regulatory problems that are created as a result of the
inconsistent application of the term “donor”, legislative
change to AHRA section 10 and the proposed 2018
Regulations on Safety of Sperm and Ova. These legislative
instruments have reframed the boundaries of health and
31

Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at para 243.
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safety harms to create dangerous liminal legal regulatory
spaces.32 It concludes that the amendments at subsection
10(2)(c) further reveal the problems of Canada’s
misshapen and misplaced AHRA.
BRIEF HISTORY OF ASSISTED HUMAN
REPRODUCTION ACT, 2004
Canada’s AHRA 2004 passed after nearly twenty years of
extensive consultation, in-depth study and, at times,
acrimonious debate.33 It is considered by many legal and
policy scholars to be seriously flawed.34 The Act had
freshly achieved Royal Assent when Quebec contested the
use of federal criminal law powers to regulate the practice

32

Graeme Laurie, “Liminality and the Limits of Law in Health Research
Legislation: What are We Missing in the Spaces in-Between?” (2017)
25:1 Med L Rev 47 at 48–49.

33

Ottawa, Privy Council Office, Proceed with Care - Final Report of the
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (1993) (Chair:
Patricia Baird); House of Commons, Assisted Human Reproduction:
Building Families (December 2001). The Baird report was
voluminous. List of research studies and researchers can be found in
the Appendix. This was a Parliamentary Committee Report. See also
Monique Hébert, Nancy M Chenier, & Sonia Norris, Legislative
History of Bill C-13, (10 October 2002), Library of Parliament.

34

Pamela M White, “‘A Less than Perfect Law’: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act” in Kristy Horsey, ed,
Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Regulation Revisited, (London:
Routledge, 2015) 170; François Baylis and Jocelyne Downie, “A Tale
of Assisted Human Reproduction Canada: A Tragedy in Five Acts”
(2013) 25:2 CJWL 183 [Baylis & Downie “A Tale of Assisted Human
Reproduction”]; Alana Cattapan “Rhetoric and Reality: ‘Protecting’
Women in Canadian Public Policy on Assisted Human Reproduction”
(2013) 25:2 CJWL 202.
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of fertility medicine.35 In 2010, the SCC agreed with
Quebec’s position in Ref re AHRA and rendered the
sections of the Act legislating in areas under provincial
constitutional jurisdiction ultra vires, most notably the
practice of medicine and research.36 The SCC decision left
intact the sections protecting human health and safety, such
as the testing and screening of human reproductive
materials used for assisted reproduction.37 The prohibition
of activities deemed to be morally unacceptable (cloning,
sex selection, discrimination, and commodification of
human gamete donation and surrogacy) were upheld, as
were the sections enabling enforcement of permitted
activities, including the reimbursement of expenses
incurred by gamete donors and surrogates.38
The purpose and effect of the SCC 2010 decision,
Ref re AHRA, centres on the use of federal criminal law

35

Décret 1177-2004; Décret 73-2006; Attorney General of Quebec v
Attorney General of Canada, 2008 QCCA 1167, [2008] RJQ 1551.

36

Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27. Sections rendered ultra vires: ss 10, 11,
13–18 and 40(2) (3), (3.1), (4) and (5) and 44(2) and (3).

37

AHRA, supra note 8. See the new section 10, Assisted Human
Reproductive Act, 2004 as amended in 2012.

38

Assisted Human Reproductive Act, 2004 supra, note 8, ss 5–9.
Discussion of the decision found in: Barbara von Tigerstrom, “Federal
Health Legislation and the Assisted Human Reproduction Act
Reference” (2011) 74:33 Sask L Rev 41; Jonathan D Whyte
“Federalism and Moral Regulation: A Comment on the Reference Re
Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (2011) 74 Sask L Rev 45; Graeme
G Mitchell “Not a General Regulatory Power: A Comment on
Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (2011) 54 SCLR
633.; AHRA, supra note 8, s 12.
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powers to uphold morality and deter a public health evil.39
Relying on the argument advanced by Rand J. in the
Margarine reference, Ref re AHRA reaffirms that the “evil”
or threat must be real and legitimate.40 The decision serves
to remind Canadian legislators that in matters of health (an
area of provincial constitutional responsibility), criminal
law (when used to achieve a public purpose) is restricted to
the suppression of a public health evil.41 It underscores that
mere identification of public purpose is not sufficient
justification for invoking federal criminal law powers: as
the SCC stated, the “evil must be real and the apprehension
of harm must be reasonable.”42 It is through this
interpretive lens that subsequent AHRA legislative
amendments and regulatory reform such as the one recently
undertaken by Health Canada must be critically assessed
and evaluated.
2012 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO THE
AHRA
In March 2012, the federal government used omnibus tax
legislation, Bill C-38: The Jobs, Growth and Long-term
Prosperity Act, to amend the Assisted Human Reproductive

39

Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at 189; J-F Gaudreault-DesBiens & N
Karazavin, “Canada’s New Reproductive Technologies: A Moral Evil
or Signs of Beneficial Medical Progress?” (2012) Public Law 147;
Whyte, supra note 38.

40

Reference re Validity of Section 5 (a) Dairy Industry Act, [1949] SCR
1, 1 DLR 433; Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at 251.

41

Ogbogu, supra note 25 at 93.

42

Ref Re AHRA, supra note 27 at 14.
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Act, 2004.43 The Assisted Human Reproduction Agency
was eliminated, thereby saving the federal government
some $10 million, though it soon became apparent that any
fiscal savings were likely to be considerably less, given that
the Agency had never managed to spend even half of its
annual budget.44 Additionally, Health Canada was asked to
assume a limited number of assisted reproduction
regulatory, enforcement, and outreach responsibilities.45
The 2012 Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity
Act amendments also performed a legal administrative
housekeeping function consistent with a regulatory pattern
current at the time that resulted in the elimination of one
regulation for every new one established.46 The sections of
the AHRA rendered ultra vires by the SCC decision in Ref
re AHRA were repealed. At the same time, it consolidated
a number of related regulatory responsibilities found in
43

Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21.

44

Tom Blackwell “Government Shutters Agency that Oversees Canada’s
Fertility and Assisted Reproduction Industry”, National Post (30
March 2012), online: <nationalpost.com/news/government-shuttersagency-that-oversees-canadas-fertility-and-assisted-reproductionindustry>; Anne Kingston “Assisted Human Reproduction Canada:
The Budget Cut Everyone Missed”, Maclean’s Canada (2 April 2012),
online: <macleans.ca/society/science/assisted-human-reproductioncanada-the-budget-cut-everyone-missed/>; Health Canada, What We
Heard, supra note 13 at 3.1.

45

See the critique of this administrative change presented in Baylis &
Downie, “A Tale of Assisted Human Reproduction”, supra note 34.

46

Laura Jones, “Cutting Red Tape in Canada: A Regulatory Reform
Model for the United States?” (November 2015) Mercatus Center at
George
Mason
University,
online:
<www.mercatus.org/system/files/Jones-Reg-Reform-BritishColumbia.pdf>.

MORAL EVILS V. HEALTH AND SAFETY EVILS

71

other statutes. For example, sections of the AHRA 2004 that
regulated the use of human ova and sperm under the
Human Pathogens and Toxic Materials Act along with the
regulation that had mandated the testing and screening
regime for human sperm under the federal Food and Drugs
Act were repealed47 thereby permitting human sperm and
ova screening and testing, along with tracing and
identification requirements, to be located wholly within the
ambit of the AHRA at the amended section 10. The
investigative abilities of Health Canada were strengthened
and inspection provisions associated with the statute’s
regulations were revised.48
The 2012 AHRA amendments have been
characterised by some scholars as a repeat performance of
a failed legislative project, while others have been less
generous in their criticism of Canada’s renewed legislative
foray into the law of assisted reproduction.49 None of the
critiques of the 2012 AHRA amendments, however, have
examined the implications of imposing screening and
testing regulations on an “obtained” ova “donated” by a
traditional surrogate for use in her own surrogate

47

Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21.

48

Ibid. See also s 45–68 of the AHRA, supra note 8.

49

Alana Cattapan & Sara Cohen, “The Devil We Know: The
Implications of Bill C-38 for Assisted Human Reproduction in
Canada” (2013) 35:7 JOGC 654 at 654; Baylis & Downie “A Tale of
Assisted Human Reproduction”, supra note 34.

72

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

pregnancy50—a requirement added to the Act without
public consultation or discussion by Parliament.51
In the absence of scholarly scrutiny, we need to
examine the implications that legislative change involving
traditional surrogates could have for reproductive law and
policy. If the objective is to discourage the practice, then
the requirement to screen and test obtained own ova used
by a traditional surrogate delivers an unexpected punitive
punch. On the other hand, if the purpose is to protect the
traditional surrogate and her offspring from a health harm,
the identified health risks need to be real and the protective
measures proportionate. Finally, if the goal is to shelter
Canadians from the harm of a moral evil, one needs to
determine why traditional surrogacy, when performed
through IVF as that is the only way to “obtain” ova from a
woman, constitutes an evil that is absent when traditional
50

Glenn Rivard, “Federal and Provincial Jurisdictions with Respect to
Health: Struggles and Symbiosis” in Trudo Lemmens, Andrew
Flavelle Martin, & Cheryl Milne, eds, Regulating Creation: The Law,
Ethics and Policy of Assisted Reproduction (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2017) 63 at 80–82. Rivard makes no reference to the
requirement to screen and test of surrogate ova donors.

51

“Bill C-38, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget
tabled in Parliament”, 3rd reading, House of Commons Debates, 146–
42 (18 June 2012) at 1700 (Hon Andrew Scheer); “Bill C-38, An Act
to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament”,
House of Commons Debates, oral questions, 146–41 (15 Jun 2012) at
1115. Bill C-38 passed without discussion as to the amendments being
made to the AHRA apart from Mr Wayne Marston (Hamilton EastStony Mountain, NDP) noting that the Assisted Human Reproduction
Agency would be shut down and Ms Megan Leslie (Halifax, NDP) who
asked about the fiscal savings to be achieved from the shutdown of the
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency: Official Report of Debates
(Hansard), 41-1 (15 June 2012) at 9612.

MORAL EVILS V. HEALTH AND SAFETY EVILS

73

surrogacy occurs as a result of artificial insemination,
which is the more common way to undertake traditional
surrogacy.52
EXAMINATION OF 2012 AHRA SECTION 10
AMENDMENTS
The 2012 AHRA amendments at section 10 replace the
original section 10 that was rendered ultra vires by the SCC
in Ref re AHRA.53 The purpose of the impugned section 10
had been to support a federally managed licencing regime
for human gametes used in assisted human reproduction.54
With this type of federal activity ruled constitutionally
invalid, the federal government repositioned its legislative
responsibilities and subsequent use of Criminal Code
powers to fall within a human health protection mandate.
Indeed, at subsection 10(1) the health objective of testing
and screening of human gametes used in assisted human
reproduction is stated as being:
10(1) The purpose of this section is to
reduce the risks to human health and
52

White, “Why We Don’t Know”, supra note 30 at 64. Canada keeps no
statistics on the practice of traditional surrogacy. The Canadian
Assisted Reproductive Registry (CARTR-Plus) counts only gestational
surrogate cycles. This is one of the many Assisted Human
Reproduction data gaps that exist in Canada. The 2018 Safety of Sperm
and Ova Regulations make no attempt to mandate an IVF registry
documenting the number and types of sperm and ova screened and
tested. For a commentary on traditional surrogacy practices see: Jenni
Millbank, “Rethinking ‘Commercial’ Surrogacy in Australia” (2015)
12:3 J Bioethical Inq 477.

53

Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21 at 717.

54

Ref re AHRA, supra note 27 at para 93.
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safety arising from the use of sperm
or ova for the purpose of assisted
human reproduction, including the
risk of the transmission of disease.
In the subsections that follow subsection 10(1),
human sperm and ova obtained from specified types of
donors at subsections 10(2)(a, b, c) and used by certain
categories of female persons identified at subsections
10(2)(a, b, c) for the purposes of assisted reproduction may
be exempted from testing and screening as indicted in
subsection 10(3) and can be distributed and imported
pursuant to subsection 10(4). At subsection 10(5) the term
“common-law partner” is defined and at section 61, an
amended set of penalties for failure to abide by the
regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section 10 are
specified.
It should be noted that the AHRA prohibits all uses
of human gametes and embryos in assisted human
reproduction unless the activity is expressly permitted by
regulation.55 The amendments made in 2012 preserve this
position. As a result, assisted reproduction is characterised
as a non-normative and unnatural activity. This
characterization may have had salience in the 1980s when
the practice was innovative, but it is much less defensible
today. At section 10 the AHRA explicitly legalises a
fertility patient’s use of their own unscreened and untested
ova and the unscreened and tested sperm and ova of their

55

Section 8 (Consent) Regulations, supra note 1. The regulations are
silent with respect to destruction of embryos no longer wanted for
reproductive use, training, or research.
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spouse, common-law partner, or sexual partner.56 It makes
the reproductive use of all other unscreened and untested
human reproductive material illegal on the grounds of
health and safety risk.57
IDENTIFICATION OF THE TYPE OF DONATED
SPERM AND OVUM TO BE TESTED AND
SCREENED
Section 10 amendments introduced by the Jobs, Growth
and Long-term Prosperity Act state:58
10(2) Subject to subsection (3), no person shall
distribute, make use of or import any of the
following for the purpose of assisted human
reproduction:
(a) sperm that has been obtained from a
donor and that is meant for the use of a
female person other than a spouse,
common-law partner or sexual partner
of the donor;
(b) an ovum that has been obtained from a
donor and that is meant for the use of a
female person other than the donor or
the spouse, common-law partner or
sexual partner of the donor; or
56

Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21, s 10(2);
AHRA, supra note 8.

57

Ibid.

58

Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, supra note 21 at s 714–
18.
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(c) an ovum that has been obtained from a
donor and that is meant for the donor’s
use as a surrogate mother.
10(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if:
(a) tests have been conducted in respect of
the sperm or ovum in accordance with
the regulations, and the sperm or ovum
has been obtained, prepared, preserved,
quarantined, identified, labelled and
stored and its quality assessed in
accordance with the regulations; and
(b) the donor of the sperm or ovum has
been screened and tested, and the
donor’s suitability has been assessed, in
accordance with the regulations.
10(4) No person shall, except in accordance with
the regulations, engage in any activity
described in paragraph (3)(a) or (b) in
respect of any of the following with the
intention of distributing or making use of it
for the purpose of assisted human
reproduction:
(a) sperm described in paragraph (2)(a);
(b) an ovum described in paragraph (2)(b);
or
(c) an ovum described in paragraph (2)(c).
In subsection 10(5), “common-law partner”, in
relation to an individual, refers to a person who is
cohabiting with the individual in a conjugal relationship at
the relevant time, having so cohabited for a period of at
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least one year.59
The penalties for failure to screen, test, label,
distribute and import as specified in the regulations are set
out in section 61:60
61

A person who contravenes any provision of
this Act—other than any of sections 5 to 7 and
9—or of the regulations or an order made
under subsection 44(1) is guilty of an offence
and
(a) is liable, on conviction on indictment,
to a fine not exceeding $250,000 or
to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years, or to both; or
(b) is liable, on summary conviction, to a
fine not exceeding $100,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding
two years, or to both.61

WHO IS A “DONOR” AND WHY DOES THIS
MATTER?
The above noted subsections 10(2)(a, b, and c) begin by
identifying gametes—sperm and ovum—obtained from
three different types of “donors”. But before we examine
59

Ibid at 718.

60

Ibid at 735.

61

Semen Processing Regulations, supra note 9. No regulations pursuant
to the amended s 10 have been made. Penalties for failure to test and
screen human sperm are specified in SOR/96-254 [Processing and
Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception].
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who the “donors” are and whether their gametes need to be
tested and screened, we need to understand what the AHRA
means by the term “donor”.
In law, the AHRA situates the act of donation— the
giving, granting or conferring of human reproductive
material— to the person from whose body the ovum or
sperm was obtained. The AHRA considers all persons
undertaking IVF treatment to be “donors”, even if the
“donation” is made to oneself in the form of autologous use
or when sperm or ovum are to be used by the donor’s
spouse, common-law or sexual partner. The AHRA at
section 3, defines a “donor” as: 62
(a)

(b)

in relation to human reproductive material,
the individual from whose body it was
obtained, whether for consideration or not;
and
in relation to an in vitro embryo, a donor as
defined in the regulations.

The AHRA Section 8 (Consent Regulations)
maintain the broad definition of the term “donor” and the
“act of donation”. It specifies permitted uses, including
own-use, third-party reproductive use, research use, and
fertility treatment testing, which must be undertaken with
the consent of the “donor” or “donors” in the case of an

62

AHRA, supra note 8, s 3.

MORAL EVILS V. HEALTH AND SAFETY EVILS

79

embryo.63 The goal being to ensure that all fertility patients
are able to exercise autonomy in decision-making
regarding reproductive use and donation of excess gametes
and embryos for training, research and reproductive uses
of others.64 However, it should be noted that the AHRA
Section 8 (Consent Regulations) clearly defines the “thirdparty” to be a reproductive party who is separate and apart
from the “donor” of the ova, sperm, or embryo used in
assisted reproduction.65
A major difficulty created by the AHRA definition
of “donor” applied to the person as “donor” (noun) and the
“act of giving” (verb) is that it encompasses both concepts
in law: a “donor” who gives to oneself shares their title with
a “donor” who gives human reproductive material to
others. In so doing, it confounds and blurs common-use
definitions of “donor” and “donation”. The Canadian
Oxford Dictionary, for example, defines a “donor” as a
person who gives (donates) blood, organs, or reproductive
tissues to a third-party.”66 Thus, the act of donation is
defined as being other-motivated and other-directed. It is
63

Section 8 (Consent) Regulations, supra note 1. The Section 8 Consent
Regulations state that a donor must provide consent for creation and
use of an embryo: (i) for their own reproductive use; (ii) use following
death; (iii) third-party use; and (iv) research (including IVF
instruction). No changes have been introduced to the Section 8
Consent Regulations as a result of the s 10 amendments.

64

Glenn Rivard & Judy Hunter, The Law of Assisted Human
Reproduction (Markham: Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2005) at 39–40.

65

Section 8 Consent Regulations, supra note 1, ss 1(a)(i) and 1(a)(ii).

66

Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed, sub verbo “donor”: “2. a person
who provides blood for a transfusion, semen for insemination, or an
organ or tissue for transplant”. Origin from Latin donator, donare.
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frequently characterised as the act of “gift” giving.67 The
AHRA however takes a much broader view of who is a
donor and the act of giving, as it considers the donor and
the act of donation to include the giving of a gamete or
embryo to oneself as well as to others, including one’s
spouse, common-law or sexual partner, in addition to the
donation to anonymous or known third-parties for their
reproductive use, or for research and training.
To further complicate the matter, the AHRA’s
terminology differs from language adopted by provincial
statutes, fertility association guidelines, 2017 CAN/CSA
Standard,68 and the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and
Ova Regulations.69 In these examples, “donor” refers to the
person who donates human reproductive material or
embryos for the reproductive use by a third-party.
67

See Richard Morris Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human
Blood to Social Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970).

68

Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25 [BC FLA]; All Families Are Equal
Act (Parentage and Related Registrations Statute Law Amendment),
SO 2016, c 23 [ON All Families Act]; 2017 Can/CSA supra note 10.
Ontario sidesteps the use of the term “donor” by making the action of
donation of reproductive material a negative action as it concerns
parentage: “Provision of reproductive material, embryo not
determinative” 5(1) reads: “A person who provides reproductive
material or an embryo for use in assisted reproduction: (a) is not, by
reason only of the provision, a parent of the child; and (b) shall not, by
reason only of the provision, be recognized in law to be a parent of the
child”; Jon Havelock et al, Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society
Guidelines for Third Party Reproduction. Montreal: Canadian Fertility
and Andrology Society, 2016 at 2, online: <cfas.ca/clinical-practiceguidelines/> [CFAS Guidelines].

69

Canada Gazette, Proposed Regulations, 152:43, “Safety of Sperm and
Ova Regulations” [2018 Proposed Regulations], online:
<www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2018/2018-10-27/html/reg2-eng.html>.
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For example, in a British Columbia case involving
traditional surrogacy, Fitzpatrick J. determined that the
petitioner, K.G., “does not come within the definition of a
‘donor’ since his donation of sperm for the conception was
for his “own reproductive use”.70 This ruling is guided by
the British Columbia Family Law Act definition of a
“donor” as:
a person who, for the purposes of assisted
reproduction other than for the person's own
reproductive use, provides:
(a) his or her own human
reproductive material, from
which a child is conceived; or
(b) an embryo created through the
use of his or her human
reproductive material.71
The province of Ontario on the other hand sidesteps
the use of the term “donor” by making the action of
donation of reproductive material a negative permission as
it concerns parentage. The All Families Are Equal Act at
section 5.1 states: “A person who provides reproductive
material or an embryo for use in assisted reproduction, (a)
is not, by reason only of the provision, a parent of the child;
and (b) shall not, by reason only of the provision, be
recognized in law to be a parent of the child.”72

70

Family Law Act (Re), 2016 BCSC 598, 80 RFL (7th) 443 at 17.

71

BC FLA, supra note 68, s 20.

72

ON, All Families Act, supra note 68, s 5.1.
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If one looks at the Canadian Fertility and Andrology
Society (CFAS) publication, Guidelines for Third Party
Reproduction, yet another definition is used. This
document adopts a definition similar to the one cited in the
British Columbia Family Law Act. A gamete donor is a: “a
person who donates oocytes or sperm to a known or
anonymous recipient for the purpose of achieving a
pregnancy for the recipient and their partner (if
applicable).”73
Another guidance document, the 2017 CAN/CSA
Standard, acknowledges that the AHRA provides a broader
definition of “donor” noting that the Act defines “donor”
as the “the individual from whose body it [human
reproductive material] was obtained, whether for
consideration or not.”74 The 2018 proposed Safety of
Sperm and Ova Regulation defines a “donor” as: “an
individual who provides reproductive tissues for use in a
recipient who is not his or her spouse, common law partner,
or sexual partner, in accordance with established medical
criteria and procedures.”75
Yet, upon closer inspection of the 2017 CAN/CSA
Standard’s definition of donor, it becomes apparent that the
notion of who is a donor is more nuanced than it appears
on first reading. As the emphasis is on “providing”
reproductive tissues for use in a recipient who is not his or
her own spouse, common-law partner, or sexual partner, it
addresses the case of sperm provided by the intended father
73

CFAS Guidelines, supra note 68 at 2.

74

2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10 at 17.

75

Ibid.
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and used to fertilise the ovum provided by the traditional
surrogate. Sperm used in this manner would need to be
screened and tested. Yet, it is not clear that the Standard’s
definition fully encompasses the situation of ova provided
by a traditional surrogate as she would be receiving her
own human reproductive material.
The 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations on the other hand adopts a more restrictive
notion of donor compared with the one used throughout the
2012 AHRA. The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement
notes that the new prohibition introduced by the 2012
legislative amendment at section 10 had as its purpose the
reduction of the risks to human health and safety arising
from the used of third-party donor sperm and ova for the
purposes of Assisted Human Reproduction. The definition
of donor used in the proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations refers to third-party donor sperm and or ova
named as “donor sperm or ova” which are defined as:
donor sperm or ova that has obtained from a
donor [third-party] and is meant for use by a
female person other than the spouse,
common-law partner or sexual partner of the
donor. Donor sperm or ova may be from an
anonymous donor, a donor who acts as a
surrogate mother, or may be from donor who
is known to the recipient but who is not their
spouse, common-law partner or sexual

84
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partner.76
The 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations states that a “donor of ova” includes persons
who act as a surrogate. As the type of “surrogate” is not
defined, it could both treatment forms of traditional
surrogacy: i) surrogacy achieves conception through IUI
and ii) where an ova is obtained from the surrogate and
fertilised ex utero before being transferred back to the
traditional surrogate. The possible expansion in the
proposed regulation of the surrogate screening and testing
requirements to include all traditional surrogates retains a
certain degree of logic regarding the notion of “third-party”
reproduction. However, to do so would be at odds with the
AHRA at subsection 10(2)(c).
To summarize, a face-value reading of the 2017
CAN/CSA Standard definition would lead one to conclude
that a traditional surrogate who produced the “obtained
ova” and who is also the recipient of it appears not to be
captured within the scope of the definition.77 The proposed
2018 Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulation states that a
third-party donor includes a surrogate. However, the
Regulation is not specific as to whether surrogate’s donated
76

2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69. Also, the 2018 Proposed
Regulations on the Administration and Enforcement of the Assisted
Human Reproduction Act, supra note 16 adds a further wrinkle to the
definition of “donor of embryo”. For the purposes of enforcement at s
54 of the Act in that the genetic relationship to the embryo carries more
decisional weight in circumstances where the individual who did not
provide genetic material (sperm or ovum) is no longer a spouse or
common-law partner. See s 1(1), s 1(3) and s 3(3) of the proposed
enforcement regulations.

77

2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10 at 17.
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third-party ova is an “obtained” ex utero ova or whether it
includes all forms of traditional surrogacy thereby opening
the door to mandatory screening of larger sub-set of
surrogates.78 As gestational surrogates do not donate an
ova they would not be caught by the mandatory screening
and testing regime outlined by the 2018 proposed
Regulations.
The definition of “donor” is crucial to examining
and understanding the changes made to section 10 of the
AHRA. It sets the dividing line separating autologous and
own-use donation from third-party donated gametes. Use
of untested and unscreened third-party sperm and ova bears
a criminal penalty.79 The requirement to test and screen a
traditional surrogate’s ex utero ova as specified at
subsection 10(2)(c) transforms her autologous use into a
“third-party” activity. In so doing, the AHRA and
accompanying regulations situate the traditional surrogate
as a third-party donor who poses a health and safety threat.
This sleight of hand whereby the traditional
surrogate is both third-party ova donor and surrogate who
uses her own ovum distances her from the fertility patient
who uses her own gametes or the person who receives the
ova of her spouse, common-law or sexual partner. In these
instances, no testing and screening is required as their use
of such ova pose no health or safety use to the recipient.
Interestingly, it is possible to observe the effects of this
repositioning in in the manner in which fertility treatments
are recorded. Canadian and American fertility clinics, for
78

2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69 at 2.

79

AHRA, supra note 8, s 10(3).
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example, report gestational surrogates80 as receiving
embryos containing either “own use” or “third-party” ova.
In all cases where a gestational surrogate receives an
embryo labelled “own use ova”, it is in fact the intended
mother’s ova that is being used. This occurs because the
clinics consider the intended mother to be the fertility
patient, not the gestational surrogate.81
This paper argues that a similar reimagining occurs
in the amendment at subsection 10(2)(c). By turning a
traditional surrogate into a third-party donor, her ability to
determine the use of her obtained ova will be constrained,
especially if it means that she must agree to legally
“donate” her ova to the intended parents. In this regard, the
implications for consent and change in status of the
mandatory screening and testing requirements as set out in
AHRA section 10 and the obligations imposed by the
Section 8 (Consent) Regulations given her newly acquired
status as third-party donor are significant.
FROM WHICH TYPE OF DONOR IS SPERM AND
OVA TO BE SCREENED AND TESTED?
To better understand the implications of the proposed
regulatory regime, one needs to examine which type of
80

Canadian and US assisted reproduction registries do not report fertility
treatments given to traditional surrogates. See White, “Why We Don’t
Know”, supra note 30 at 64.

81

See Kiran M Perkins et al, “Trends and Outcomes of Gestational
Surrogacy in the United States” (2016) 106:2 Fertility & Sterility 435.
The analysis undertaken is conducted from the perspective of the
intended parents as they are viewed by the fertility industry to be the
patients with the result that very little information is obtained about the
surrogate undergoing the embryo transfer or pregnancy.
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donor and donation triggers mandatory screening and
testing.
Sperm donors
According to AHRA 2012 at subsection 10(2)(a),
“obtained” sperm not used by the donor’s spouse,
common-law or sexual-partner must be tested and screened
pursuant to the criteria established by subsection 10(3). In
principle, the approach represents no change to existing
law.
In response to the use of untested sperm that
resulted in unfortunate transmissions of HIV, all human
sperm used by the person other than the donor’s spouse,
common-law or sexual partner, or imported for third-party
reproductive use must comply with the Health Canada
screening and testing standard instituted in 1996.82 The
sperm testing regulations were further tightened in 2000
after a woman contracted chlamydia trachomatis from an
infected donor.83
The text of the screening and testing amendment at
subsections 10(3)(a) and (b) echo the procedures mandated
82

Ter Neuzen v Korn [1995] 3 SCR 674, 127 DLR (4th) 577; MR Araneta
et al, “HIV Transmission through Donor Artificial Insemination”
(1995) 273:11 JAMA 854 at 858; Processing and Distribution of
Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, supra note 9.

83

Health Canada, Directive: Technical Requirements for Therapeutic
Donor Insemination, Ottawa: Health Canada, 2000 [Health Canada
Directive]; Alana Cattapan & Françoise Baylis “The Trouble with
Paying for Sperm”, Toronto Star (9 April 2016), online:
<www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2016/04/09/the-troublewith-paying-for-sperm.html>.
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in the 1996 Semen Regulation, specified in the 2000
Technical Requirements Directive, and explained in the
Guidance document.84 It is these technical conditions for
the screening, testing, and labelling of human sperm that
are under review as part of the Health Canada regulation
exercise85 and to which the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm
and Ova Regulations and Directive would apply.86
In the case of surrogates, the sperm of the intended
father or donor sperm if used will need to be screened and
tested for sexually communicable diseases. Given that
gestational and traditional surrogates could know the
sperm donor, the screening and testing regime to be applied
could include that of the Designated Reproductive Donor
schema specified by the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard and
84

Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception
Regulations, supra note 9; Health Canada Directive, supra note 83.
See: Health Canada, Guidance on the Processing and Distribution of
Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations (Guide-0041), Ottawa:
Health Canada, 2004.

85

SOR/96-254 is controversial especially for male donors who have sex
with males and for designated donors. See Marvel, supra note 5; See
also Health Canada What We Heard, supra note 13 regarding
comments received in the 2016–2017 consultation. The 2018 proposed
Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations and accompanying Directive
contain restrictions on sperm donation by men who have sex with men
and by women who have sex with men who have sex with men. See
the following commentary: Rob Salerno “New Draft of Assisted
Human Reproduction Act Continues Anti-Gay Discrimination”, Daily
Xtra. (8 November 2018), <www.dailyxtra.com/new-draft-of-assistedhuman-reproduction-act-continues-anti-gay-discrimination-12799>.

86

2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69. The accompanying
Directives
are
found
online:
<www.canada.ca/en/healthcanada/programs/consultation-assisted-human-reproductionregulations/technical-directive.html> [Proposed Directives].
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outlined by the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations. It should be noted that “designated sperm and
ova donors” are not a donor type identified in the AHRA
though this type of donation has been a contested feature
of the assisted human reproduction landscape since the
1996 Semen Regulations were enacted.87
If we look at the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard specific
criteria for donor suitability and the required elements for
donor selection and the screening and testing regime to be
applied to anonymous and designated reproductive donors
are specified.88 Compared to the 1996 Semen Regulation
and related Directive, the restrictions imposed on
“Designated Reproductive Donors” have been relaxed and
the scope for designating a known donor has been widened.
A Directed Reproductive Donor is defined in the 2017
CAN/CSA Standard as:
a person who is the source of reproductive
cells or tissues [including semen, ova or
embryos (to which the donor contributed the
spermatozoa and ovum) to a specific
recipient, and who knows and is known by
the recipient before donation.
Notes:
1)
2)

This term does not include a sexually
intimate partner. See Donor.
The terms “designated donor” and
“known donor” are also used when

87

Marvel, supra note 5.

88

2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10.
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referring to a “directed reproductive
donor”.89
The 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations at section 32 to section 43 like the 2017
CAN/CSA Standard adopt a relaxation of the requirements
for the screening and testing of the designated sperm and
ova donor defined at section 32 as: (a) the “donor and the
recipient know each other; and (b) the health professional
requests the sperm or ova from a primary establishment in
the context of a directed donation.”90 No length of time for
knowing a donor or the basis on which a donor is known
has been specified which might have been a precautionary
additional measure to have included given that social
media is increasingly used by those seeking traditional
surrogates and gamete donors.91
Also, the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations unlike the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard do not
contain a provision recommending counselling of
surrogates who elect to receive directed human
reproductive material (sperm and ova). Counselling or
mandatory requirement to provide health and safety
information about the possible risks associated with
waiving the post-quarantine tests for infectious diseases
89

Ibid.

90

2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, s 32.
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See research using online surrogacy contacts: Zsuzsa Berend, “The
Romance of Surrogacy” (2012) 27:4 Sociological Forum 913 at 913–
14 [Berend, “Romance of Surrogacy”]; Zsuzsa Berend, “‘We Are All
Carrying Someone Else’s Child!’: Relatedness and Relationships in
Third-Party Reproduction” (2016) 118:1 American Anthropologist 24
[Berend, “Relatedness”].
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would have been a prudent health and safety measure to
have included.92 It could have been justified on the basis
that recent US research findings indicate that only 75% of
gestational surrogates receive counselling.93 The
proportion of Canadian gestational and traditional
surrogates who receive counselling is not known.
Even so, it may be difficult given the ambit of the
AHRA to mandate fertility clinics to offer counselling to
donors given that such an activity could be viewed as
falling within the scope of the provision of health care
treatment which is a provincial constitutional
responsibility. Apart from Quebec, provincial governments
have not sought to regulate fertility treatment.94 In Ontario,
the 2016 Ontario All Families are Equal Act requires that
surrogates and intended parents have a legal arrangement
in place but access to counselling is not explicitly
required.95 In this area of fertility treatment, Canada’s
approach has been to leave such matters to the unelected
92
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Assemble Nationale Du Quebec 2015, c 25. See amendments at s 10
regarding delivery of services and drawing up of ethical and safety
guidelines by the Collège des médecins du Québec.
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noted.
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professional organisations
recommend and implement.

such as

the

CFAS

to

Ova donors
The 2012 amendments of the AHRA at section10(2)(b)
specify that all human ovum used for human reproduction
not used by the “donor” or by the “donor’s spouse,
common-law or sexual partner” must be screened and
tested. The 2012 AHRA amendment mandating screening
and testing of ova used in third-party reproduction corrects
a long-standing legislative omission identified in 2005 by
Rivard and Hunter who recommended that the government
take steps to regulate health and safety measures for human
ova used in third-party reproduction.96 It is a regulatory
modification that the federal agency, Assisted Human
Reproduction Canada, could have brought into force prior
to its suspension in 2012 had it used its mandate to protect
the health and safety of Canadians. Unfortunately, it did
not.97 At the time of the 2012 legislative amendment to the
AHRA, Canadian clinicians welcomed this long overdue
legislative change requiring testing and screening of ova
used by third-parties.98
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The practice of fertility medicine has evidenced an
increasing use of third-party donated ova.99 The change in
practice has coincided with dramatic improvements in the
techniques used to cryopreserve ova which is no longer
considered to be an unproven or experimental technique.
Research findings have failed to demonstrate superior
pregnancy outcomes using fresh oocytes (ova) compared
with pregnancy outcomes using vitrified egg-banked
oocytes.100 The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement
accompanying the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations also documents changes in fertility clinic
practices. It observes a reliance on imported donated ova
while at the same time commenting that it is not aware of
any transmission of disease caused by donor ova. Even so,
there exists a need to establish Canadian ova screening and
testing protocols.101
The 2017 CAN/CSA Standard provides operational
guidance for the screening and testing of third-party ova
donors, both anonymous and directed.102 It establishes the
99
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Survey 775.

101

2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69. See the preface to the
Regulations: Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement at 3.

102

2017 Can/CSA, supra note 10, ss 13.2.2–13.3. Genetic history and
testing is specified at s 13.7. See Proposed Directives, supra note 86, s
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screening criteria for donation which includes the
recording of the donor’s family genetic history and medical
testing for diseases, and establishes the criteria for donor
suitability evaluations.103 A similar set of requirements is
found in the 2018 proposed Directives for Safety of Sperm
and Ova regarding requirements for documenting family
and medical history of the ova donor, a category that the
2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations tells
us includes surrogates.104
Subsection 10(2)(a) of the 2012 AHRA indicates
that ova from a woman who uses her own reproductive
material (ova) is exempt from mandated screening and
testing. The 2012 amendment at subsection 10(2)(b) states
that the use of a partner’s ovum by a woman in same-sex
married, common-law and sexual relationships carry a
similar exemption from screening and testing.105 This type
of ova sharing (co-mothering) among lesbian partners is
not unknown nor uncommon, though no Canadian data

103
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104

2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations supra note 69 at
ss 22–31 for Donor Suitability and at ss 32–43 for Designated Donors.
The Proposed Directives, supra note 86, do not specify the
requirements for Designated Donors. Health Canada, supra note 14,
did note that some of the consultation submissions identified concerns
with criteria for testing and screening developed by the 2017 Can/CSA.
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exists as to its prevalence.106 Yet, one needs to ask why
Canadian legislators felt it necessary to specify that this
type of reproductive tissue exchange was permitted by law
and that the reason for its non-prohibition is one of health
and safety. The AHRA at section 3 states that
discrimination in assisted reproduction is prohibited. If
heterosexual partners are permitted to exchange sperm and
use their own ova, it is unclear why the same logic did not
automatically apply to the exchange of ova between lesbian
spouses, common-law, and sexual partners when the AHRA
was amended in 2012.
Internationally, restrictions placed on lesbian
exchange of ova have coincided with access to assisted
reproduction being based on sexual orientation and marital
status. There has also been an ethical discourse suggesting
that the medical surgery needed to remove ova from one
partner to give to another when both are fertile constitutes
unnecessary medical treatment and, as such, could be
considered maleficent.107 Currently, the legality of the
practice varies considerably across Europe depending on
legal recognition of same-sex marriage, cohabitation and
106

Daniel Bodri et al, “Shared Motherhood IVF: High Delivery Rates in
a Large Study of Treatments for Lesbian Couples Using Partner
Donated Eggs” (2017) 36:2 Reprod Biomed Online 130; Ethics
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Committee Opinion” (2013) 100:6 Fertility & Sterility 1524.

107
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De Wert & PMW Janssens, “Shared Lesbian Motherhood: A
Challenge of Established Concepts and Frameworks” (2010) 25:4 Hum
Reprod 812.
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sexual partnerships. Countries like Belgium, Finland,
Ireland, Netherlands, UK, Portugal and Spain permit it,
while others such France or Germany prohibit or actively
discourage it.108 In the UK when the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act was amended in 2008 to remove the
need for a father and lesbian partners were recognised as
legal parents the practice has become more common.109 In
the UK, the motivation driving this type of legislative
change was more focussed on ensuring that all parties can
exercise informed consent, rather than on the regulation of
the health and safety of the practice.110
By not imposing prohibitions on the use by a
fertility patient of the ova donated by her spouse, commonlaw or sexual partner, Canada’s AHRA normalizes samesex female relationships.111 It accords the exchange of ova
between female spouses, common-law, and sexual partners
an equivalency status with autologous ova used by a
woman in a heterosexual married, common-law, or sexual
relationship. Specification that the sharing of ova between
women engaged in a same-sex spousal, common-law or
sexual relationship also serves to note that the federal
government considers that the practice holds a no greater
health risk to the lesbian recipient than would be
experienced to exist for any other woman using her own
ova or in the case of a heterosexual women from receiving
108
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109
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a transfer of sperm obtained from her male spouse,
common-law, or sexual partner.
However, the reason for allowing equal treatment
for the use of shared gametes among spouses, commonlaw, and sexual partners regardless of sexual orientation
appears to be reliant on a health and safety rationale rather
than legal marital equivalency and the right to equal
treatment.112 As was ruled by the SCC in Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia (1989), “discrimination may
be described as any distinction, conduct or action, whether
intentional or not, but based on a person’s sexual
orientation, that has the effect of either imposing burdens
on an individual or group that are not imposed upon others,
or withholding or limiting access to opportunity, benefits
and advantages available to other members of society.”113
The amendment could have referenced the principle of
non-discrimination that underlies Canada’s AHRA which
holds that “persons who seek to undergo assisted
reproduction procedures must not be discriminated against,
including on the basis on their sexual orientation or marital
status.”114 However, there is no mention of this principle
in the rationale provided at section 10(1) of the 2012
AHRA.

112
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v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR
497, 170 DLR (4th) 1; Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR
(4th) 609.

113

Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, supra note 112 at 174.

114

AHRA, supra note 8, s 2(e).

98

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

It is unfortunate that the government did not use the
2012 legislative opportunity to indicate that comotherhood assisted reproduction has been permitted since
the inception of the AHRA, notwithstanding any stated
ethical concerns advanced by those arguing that intracouple egg sharing for nonmedical reasons could be
considered to be ethically non-justifiable, risky, and not
cost-effective.115 Such argumentation is weak and
profoundly dismissive of the reproductive autonomy of
lesbians.116 Moreover, little empirical research exists to
support claims that the practice is any more risky compared
to the harm endured by other patients undertaking ovarian
stimulation related to third-party ova donation or for their
own reproductive use.117 This is an example of where the
federal government has embedded a health and safety
justification for permitting co-mothering and the exchange
of ova between queer spouses and common-law and sexual
partners rather than adopting an equality-based rationale as
enabled by section 3 of the AHRA.
Traditional surrogates
The amendment at subsection 10(2)(c) created another
group of regulated autologous ova donors and users:
traditional surrogates. So, to situate the discussion in the
context of Canadian surrogacy law and policy, the legality
of surrogacy will be briefly reviewed.
115
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SURROGACY: “MORAL EVIL”
The AHRA establishes that surrogacy is legal in Canada as
long the surrogate does not receive consideration
(payment) though reimbursement of acceptable expenses is
permitted.118 Traditional surrogacy, where the surrogate is
genetically related to the child she bears for intended
parent(s), and gestational surrogacy, where the surrogate is
not genetically related to her offspring, are permitted.119
The practice of a woman conceiving and carrying a
child for an individual or couple who for medical or social
reasons are unable to have their own children has been
characterised as morally troubling as it disrupts the
normative view of motherhood.120 The practice of
surrogacy and its potential for exploitation has been a
controversial topic for Canadians.121 Concerns about
commercialisation of human reproduction, the practice of
118
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119
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traditional surrogacy, and the “moral panic” raised by the
1984 Baby M incident cast a long shadow over the
deliberations of assisted reproduction undertaken by the
1983 Baird Commission, parliamentary committees, and
parliamentarians.122 The banning of commercial surrogacy
by the AHRA conformed to the national narrative
privileging the unpaid donation of blood, organs, and
tissues, and reflected a desire on the part of regulators to
avoid an American approach to the practice of fertility
medicine.123
However, considerable social change has taken
place in Canada since the Baird Commission held public
consultations on the topic of assisted reproduction,
including surrogacy. Twenty-first century Canada has
witnessed the legalisation of same-sex marriage. IVF
surrogacy costs for cis gay couples were covered by

122
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Quebec’s IVF funded program.124 Since 2016, Ontario has
paid IVF and IUI costs incurred by gestational and
traditional
surrogates.125
Gradually
provincial
governments have been updating family law statutes to
reflect parentage made possible by assisted conception,
including traditional and gestational surrogacy.126
It is not surprising that there now exists growing
evidence that for an increasing number of childless
Canadian couples and individuals, surrogacy may be the
only way to have biological children.127 For example, a
2012 survey revealed that one-quarter of Canadian
childless adult women and 40 percent of childless adult
men would consider using a surrogate should they or their
partner be unable to carry and give birth to their biological

124
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child.128 It is not uncommon to read news articles detailing
surrogacy experiences told from various perspectives.129
Research with North American surrogates has shown that
this demographic consists primarily of middle-class,
college educated, heterosexual married women who have
had non-problematic pregnancies and who undertake the
practice for altruistic reasons regardless of the
commercial/non-commercial regime in which they
operate.130
Given this emerging acceptance of and growing
practice of gestational and traditional surrogacy,131 it is
128
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difficult to support the view that a “moral evil” rationale
could be the justification for imposing a prohibition on the
use of unscreened and untested obtained own-use ova used
by an altruistic traditional surrogate in her own pregnancy.
Thus, the reason must be as stated in the preamble to the
amendment: it is to combat “health evil”. The question that
needs to be answered is: to whom does the harm occur?
IDENTIFYING THE HEALTH EVIL EMBODIED
IN THE “OBTAINED” OVUM “DONATED” BY A
WOMAN AND USED IN HER SURROGATE
PREGNANCY
The 2012 AHRA, as amended at section 10, applies
criminal law sanctions to address the “health and safety
evils” posed by a woman’s own “obtained” ovum being
used in her surrogate pregnancy. The paper will attempt to
determine what could be the health and safety risks posed
by “obtained” traditional surrogate ova. It seeks to
ascertain whether use of unscreened and untested obtained
traditional surrogate ova warrants criminalisation.
HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS TO THE
TRADITIONAL SURROGATE
Does the use of one’s own untested and unscreened ova
jeopardize the health and safety of traditional surrogate
patient? As the traditional surrogate is the recipient of her
own human reproductive material it seems illogical to
suggest that a woman using her own ova in her own
surrogate pregnancy faces a greater health risk than do
other women who use their own ova or the ova of their
spouse or common-law or sexual partner. For a traditional

104

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

surrogate, one could well argue that the greater health risk
arises from the sperm used to fertilise her ova.
If the concern is that of transmission of a disease to
the child conceived as a result of assisted reproduction,
medical testing of the surrogate mother such as
recommended by the CFAS in the 2016 Guidelines for
Third-party Reproduction would detect the presence of
HIV, Hepatitis C or other communicable disease.132 It
should be noted however that it is recommended medical
practice for all IVF mothers, and not just traditional and
gestational surrogates, to be tested.133
Yet, one could successfully argue that it is the act
of “obtaining” the ova that poses a health risk, though in
this case it occurs to the woman herself. Ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) is a serious fertility
treatment complication, one which could result in the death
of the patient.134 While OHSS is thought to affect
approximately 1.8% of all IVF cycles,135 it nonetheless
represents one the most important negative health
outcomes associated with modern IVF practice.136 It should
be noted that little to no study of Canadian fertility patients’
132
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133
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experience of OHSS has been conducted and the annual
release of limited information from the IVF Directors’
assisted human reproduction registry (CARTR Plus)
provides minimal insight on the occurrence of this etiology
in Canadian fertility clinics.137 It needs to be noted,
however, that Health Canada has limited ability to legislate
in this area as fertility treatment is the practice of medicine
which is a provincial constitutional responsibility.
Given the above analysis, the health and safety risk
to traditional surrogates of using their own ova cannot be
the reason for mandatory screening and testing of obtained
ova and the imposition of criminal code sanctions applied
in the event that the specified screening and testing fails to
occur. The harm test established by the SCC in Ref re
AHRA cannot be said to have been fulfilled with respect to
the existence of a health and safety harm occurring to the
recipient of the traditional surrogate’s obtained ova. It is
the surrogate herself who is exposed to the “obtained” ova
and in this regard her risk is no more or less-greater than
another other IVF recipient of her own ova or the ova or
her spouse, common-law or sexual partner.

137
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HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS TO CLINIC STAFF
AND PATIENTS
Most human sperm, ova, and embryos used and stored in
IVF clinics are “autologous use” having been obtained
from the fertility patient and their spouse, common-law, or
sexual partner. These obtained sperm, ova and embryos are
intended to be used in the fertility treatments of these
individuals.138 Autologous use gametes and embryos are
not subject to mandatory screening and testing, though
fertility patients, spouses, and partners must undergo a
series of related medical tests, including ones capable of
detecting the existence of sexually transmitted diseases.139
The parties may also decide to undertake pre-natal genetic
testing or subject their own human reproductive material to
genetic screening and testing to prevent the transmission of
genetic diseases to their offspring. Such decisions are
made by the parents of the child conceived as a result of
assisted reproduction.
As it concerns the risk of the transmission of
communicable diseases, Canadian fertility clinics have
been encouraged to follow human reproductive material
138
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139
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and embryo labelling and to adopt handling and storage
protocols designed to prevent cross-contamination and
misidentification.140 It appears that Canadian IVF clinics
have voluntarily embraced the procedures and protocols
developed by the Standards Council of Canada to prevent
contamination and mislabelling, though to date no
monitoring information informs Canadian consumers
about compliance.141 The 2017 CAN/CSA Standard
recommends that fertility clinics ensure that Standard
Operating Procedures are in place to address health and
safety requirements regarding sperm, ova and embryo
preparation and preservation, and packaging, storage, and
the cleaning and maintenance of cryopreservation tank
containers.142 The 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations specify the standard operational procedures
that are to be followed as well as requiring that the
documentation and reporting of adverse reactions.143
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In light of the above information, it is difficult to
sustain the argument that unscreened and untested ova
obtained from a traditional surrogate represent a greater
risk to IVF clinic staff and other patients than autologous
ova and embryos stored, cryopreserved and handled by the
clinic. Thus, the expectation that ova obtained from a
traditional surrogate poses significant health risks to the
routine operation of IVF clinics or to other patients cannot
be the rationale for the imposition of mandatory testing and
screening.
HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN
BORN TO TRADITIONAL SURROGATES
The preamble to the AHRA includes a section setting out
ethical principles guiding the practice of assisted
reproduction in Canada. The importance of beneficence
and non-malfeasance in the practice of fertility techniques
underscores subsection 2(a) of the Act which states that
“the health and well-being of children born through the
application of assisted human reproductive technologies
must be given priority in all decisions respecting their
use.”144 The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement
accompanying the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations notes that transmission of a communicable
diseases and the risk of transmitting a serious genetic
maladies to a child conceived using donor ova compels
Health Canada to mitigate potential risks to human health
and safety that could result from the use of donor ova.”145
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As already noted, traditional and gestational
surrogates who receive treatment at Canadian fertility
clinics are tested to establish their communicable disease
status and to assess their ability to successfully conceive
and bear children. The voluntary Third-Party
Reproduction Guidelines developed by Canadian Fertility
and Andrology Society apply regardless of the fertility
treatment a surrogate may receive—ovarian stimulation,
IVF embryo transfer, and artificial insemination.146
Regulating the screening and testing of a traditional
surrogate for communicable health conditions and
documentation of medical, genetic, and family history
would provide additional health and safety assurances to
commissioning parents that the surrogate-related child
would not be prone to serious health or genetic conditions
inherited from the traditional surrogate. The acquisition of
obtained ova also enables preimplantation genetic
diagnosis (PGD) and karyotyping, processes that permit
detection of genetic defects and anomalies including
trisomy and determination of risks for serious genetic
disease.147 These genetic screening tests are not mandated
by the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
Regulations or specified in the proposed Directive even
though they would provide greater assurance of genetic
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disease detection which is after all the raison d'être for the
proposed mandatory testing and screening.
If testing and screening documentation obtained as
result of screening and testing described by the 2018
proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations and set out
in the proposed Directive was made available to surrogateborn children, they would have potentially crucial
information about their genetic parentage and medical
history. It should be noted that AHRA does not mandate that
medical, personal and family history information be
obtained from a gestational surrogate nor when traditional
surrogacy is undertaken using assisted insemination, which
is the more common practice compared with IVF.148 Thus,
there is a strong likelihood that an uneven collection of
personal information is likely to occur as more personal
health data and medical history information will be
acquired in the isolated and rare instances where ova of a
traditional surrogate are obtained.
Without a donor registry, there exists no formal
means for a donor-conceived child or a traditional
surrogate conceived child to learn about their biological
parents. Without parental disclosure, no mechanism exists
enabling them to know that they were a surrogate-born
child or that sperm or ova have been provided by persons
other than their social (intended) parents. Such information
could be important, especially as our understanding of the
implications of epi-genetic phenomena increases and in
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cases where inherited biological traits may have long-term
medical and intergenerational health consequences.
Canada’s federal donor registry, as envisaged by
the AHRA, was ruled ultra vires by the Supreme Court
decision in Ref re AHRA.149 Provincial gamete and embryo
donor registries do not exist. Submissions made to Health
Canada as part of the consultation on regulatory change
identified a need for them.150 The 10 year record keeping
requirement specified in the 2018 proposed Safety of
Sperm and Ova Regulations will not fill this information
gap.151 Given that no Canadian donor registry exists, there
is no organised and managed system that will enable the
offspring of traditional surrogates to access the information
obtained as a result of a screening and testing regime.152 As
the decision in Pratten v. British Columbia demonstrates,
knowing one’s genetic history is not a constitutional
right.153
Information indicating that one has been conceived
using donor sperm and/or ova is not recorded on birth
149
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registration forms, though it could be if Canadian
provinces were to follow the example set by the states of
Massachusetts, Florida, Michigan, and Connecticut.154
However, to do so would involve legislative change. The
BC Vital Statistics Act, for example, prevents assisted
human conception information from being recorded on
birth registration.155 In other provinces, vital statistics
legislation is silent on the matter, though the activities of
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada provide Canadian
provinces the opportunity to consider the option.156 In the
absence of intended parents providing information about
donors and surrogates, traditional surrogate-born children,
like gestational surrogate-born children and other donorconceived children, must look elsewhere to locate donor
profile information and siblings, including, for example,
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sperm and ova banks, the IVF clinic that performed the
treatments, and the Donor Sibling Registry.157
Research shows that surrogates often bond with
intended parents158 and findings from UK studies
demonstrate that gestational and traditional surrogates,
intended parents, and surrogate-born children can maintain
positive and supportive post-birth relationships.159 In
Canada, given the lack of a donor registry, the maintenance
of relationships with intended parents between surrogates
takes on heightened importance, as this may be the only
way for the traditional surrogate-born child to learn about
their genetic background. One advantage of the easing of
the restrictions imposed on designated donation could be
the facilitation of on-going contacts between sperm and
ova and surrogates including traditional surrogates.
Yet if non-malfeasance is the rationale invoked for
application of criminal law powers to the screening and
testing of only the traditional surrogates who undergo IVF
157
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treatment, surely as an underlying AHRA ethical principle,
it is owed to all offspring of traditional surrogates,
regardless of the location of the ova at time of
conception.160 The amended AHRA at subsection 10(2)(c)
represents, at best, a limited interpretation of compassion
for the donor-conceived. As it concerns an application of
criminal code powers, surely a more proportionate
approach would have been to have left the screening and
testing including the collection of surrogate medical and
genetic information to the provincial medical bodies to
regulate. This way the information could have been
obtained from all persons undergoing surrogacy not just
those persons who undergo the more medically invasive
treatments associated with IVF. There remains the need for
a Registry so that children can have access to the
information for health, medical and social reasons. The
2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations do
not achieve this larger objective.
HEALTH AND SAFETY HARM OF AN
“OBTAINED” TRADITIONAL SURROGATE’S
OVUM
On careful examination, it is difficult to determine how ova
obtained from a traditional surrogate and used in her own
pregnancy represents a health and safety harm to the
recipient—the traditional surrogate—so significant as to
justify the application of criminal code sanctions on those
who would fail to screen and test it prior to its use. The
argument for testing to prevent genetic disease to the
160
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surrogate-born child is a stronger justification though due
to its application to a very small number of traditional
surrogate-born children the sanctions appear to be are
disproportionate to the overall benefit especially when
medical testing for communicable diseases already occurs
for surrogates.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADITIONAL
SURROGATES OF AHRA AMENDMENTS
CONCERNING THE TESTING AND SCREENING
OF OVA
We now need to examine some of the legal implications of
subsection 10(2)(c). By requiring screening and testing of
an obtained ova donated by a woman and used in her
surrogate pregnancy, the AHRA appears to transform a
traditional surrogate’s ova by means of law and regulation
into a “third-party” body part notwithstanding her genetic
affinity to it. Moreover, once the obtained ovum has been
transferred back into her body, decisions made throughout
the pregnancy and on the birth of the child as to whether
she will fulfil the surrogacy arrangement will be hers to
make.
It is also important to note that the act of obtaining
an ovum from a traditional surrogate is rare. Neither the
U.S. nor the Canadian assisted reproduction registries
provide information on traditional surrogacy undertaken
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using assisted insemination or IVF.161 If we look at
provincial programs, the Ontario Fertility Program for
example, began funding IVF and assisted insemination for
surrogate patients in 2016. Under this program, it is
possible for a woman who has been or plans to be a
surrogate (traditional or gestational) to receive ovarian
stimulation for her own fertility uses. The program does not
prevent her from using her own “obtained” ova in her own
traditional surrogate pregnancy or in her own pregnancy.
Regrettably, the Ontario program does not track surrogate
treatments, and as such no information is available on the
uptake of this program by surrogates or of the outcomes.162
It is worth noting that the Ontario program
considers “gestational and traditional surrogates” to be
patients even though the clinic which undertakes the
treatment refers to the intended parents as the “fertility
patients” and the data collected by them regarding the
treatments involving the surrogate (traditional and
gestational) is recorded from the perspective of the
intended parent.163 Review of the labelling system
described in the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova
161
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Regulations for third-party donors raises questions about
its ability to address the situation where the surrogate
“donor” and the “recipient” are one in the same person and
where the ova could be used in the person’s own
pregnancy, in a surrogate pregnancy, or by another party
such as the intended mother. The proposed data recording
system appears to label the ova provided by a traditional
surrogate and used in her own pregnancy as a third-party
donor gamete. It codes the type of screening and testing
that was undertaken and documentation regarding storage
and handling. It is the “donor code” that links the donation
to the donor.164
Muddled terminology about who is the fertility
patient and when someone becomes a “third-party”
reproductive actor (surrogate and donor) reveals the
potential for problems in the area of consent to donate for
use by the traditional surrogate in her own surrogate
pregnancy, consent to donate for the use by the intended
mother in her own pregnancy, or consent to use by the
donor in her own non-surrogate pregnancy. Under such
circumstances, law and regulation create liminal legal
figures. As described above the “ova” and the donor, in this
case the traditional surrogate, assume a betwixt and
between legal reproductive status. Confusion regarding
who has authority to use an ova can occur especially when
roles become mutable and interchangeable. The case of a
BC traditional surrogate, Ms. Chonn, is one recent example
of such an occurrence.
Ms. Chonn acting as a traditional surrogate for
intended parents had undergone ovarian stimulation and
164
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had agreed to have her obtained ova fertilised using the
sperm of the intended father.165 Embryos not used in Ms.
Chonn’s first surrogate pregnancy were cryopreserved and
stored by the IVF clinic.166 Sometime later, an embryo
containing her ovum and the sperm of the intended father
was transferred to the uterus of the intended mother. Ms.
Chonn has indicated that she was not informed that the
embryo containing her ovum had been transferred to the
intended mother and that the use of the embryo occurred
without her knowledge and written consent. Ms. Chonn as
the ova donor is genetically related to the child
subsequently born to intended mother. Her role as a
traditional (genetic) surrogate is important to her and she
has stated that she “. . . couldn't fathom someone else
carrying her child.”167 The outcome of this situation has
been especially stressful for her especially in light of the
fact that she has lost contact with the parents and her
genetic off-spring.168
This case exhibits a number of characteristics
common to assisted reproduction. Reproductive roles can
be variable and interchangeable. Creation of human life
and the intermixing of family and relational bonds are
complex and potentially contested. Rules regarding the
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obtaining of consent are not always followed.169 Unless an
incident is reported by the media, the incident passes
unnoticed. Whether the Chonn incident is an outlier or
indicative of a larger problem, we do not know, as other
instances have not garnered publicity. Interestingly, no
information exists on compliance to the Section 8
(Consent) Regulations.170 Whether such an incident would
be recorded under the 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and
Ova Regulations as an adverse event is unclear.171
The amendment at subsection 10(2)(c) requiring
the screening and testing of the “obtained” ova “donated”
by a woman and used in her surrogate pregnancy means
that the traditional surrogate assumes a dual reproductive
identity: she is both an ova donor and surrogate. The
shifting status of patient, donor, reproductive gamete and
embryo recipient, and obtained ova create liminal
reproductive legal categories. When a traditional surrogate
is considered to be a “donor”, but not viewed by the clinic
as a “patient”, there exists the possibility that possible
mistakes and misunderstandings will take place like the
one encountered by Ms. Chonn.
169

See UK, Department of Health, Human Fertilization & Embryology
Authority, “State of the Fertility Sector: 2016–17” (December 2017) at
17, figure 5. The report reveals that even in a heavily regulated
jurisdiction, failure to obtain consent is a persistent problem, one that
has legal, parental, and regulatory consequences.

170

No inspection reports or notices regarding compliance to the Section 8
(Consent) Regulations have been cited or published online by Health
Canada.

171

2018 Proposed Regulations, supra note 69, s 69.1: “An establishment
and a health professional that have reasonable grounds to believe that
an adverse reaction has occurred.” The protocol appears to refer to
safety precautions rather than incorrect use or transfer.

120

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018]

CONCLUSION
The SCC in Ref re AHRA stated that “. . . criminal law
power does not give Parliament the unconditional right to
action to protect morality, safety and public health. . . . It is
not enough to identify a public purpose . . . the evil must
be real and the apprehension of harm must be
reasonable.”172
This paper has argued that when the harm test
established by the SCC in Ref re AHRA173 is applied to the
situation of a traditional surrogate using her own
“obtained” ovum in her surrogate pregnancy, one
encounters difficulty in isolating specific health and safety
risks capable of meriting criminal code sanctions being
applied to persons who would use an unscreened and
untested obtained ovum donated by a woman and used in
her own surrogate pregnancy. The paper could not identify
health and safety risks posed by unscreened and untested
traditional surrogate’s obtained ovum either to the
traditional surrogate ova recipient (the person from whom
the ova were obtained), IVF clinic and staff, or to stored
human reproductive materials and embryos obtained from
other patients. A stronger argument can be found in the
benefits to children born of a traditional surrogacy,
particularly if screening and testing could be applied to pin
point the presence or absence of inheritable genetic
diseases.
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Yet, as beneficent as genetic testing and the
collection of surrogate health and medical history
information may be, the 2012 amendment at subsection
10(2)(c) will apply to an extremely small subset of
traditional surrogate-born children. The number of children
born to traditional surrogates is unknown as no Canadian
public health agency or birth registry separately identifies
these births.174 The proportion of traditional surrogate
children conceived as a result of IVF techniques is also
unknown though IUI is the more common treatment used
by this group of surrogates.175 Decision making in the
absence of population health evidence combined with no
commensurate requirement to maintain a donor registry
renders a failure to use unscreened and untested obtained
ova used by traditional surrogate in her surrogate
pregnancy an unsubstantiated harm to the surrogate and
imposes a misplaced and misshapen law regarding the
protection of children born as a result of this type of
surrogacy. One is left wondering why failure to collect
genetic and health information from such a small group of
surrogates constitutes a pressing health and safety evil
meriting criminal law sanctions especially when the
majority of traditional surrogates will not be subject to the
mandatory testing and screening specified in the 2018
proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations and
accompanying Directives.
It is important to recall the remit of the AHRA as
stated by the government when it announced its intentions
to bring this section of the AHRA into force: “The Act
174
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protects individuals in Canada by setting out prohibited
activities related to assisted human reproduction that may
pose significant human health and safety risks or that have
been deemed to be ethically unacceptable or incompatible
with Canadian values.”176 The practice of commercial
surrogacy is a prohibited activity as it has been deemed to
be morally unacceptable and incompatible with Canadian
values. An unscreened and untested ovum obtained from a
woman and used in her surrogate pregnancy now falls into
the category of prohibited activities on the basis of its risk
to health and safety. Yet, as this paper has argued the extent
of the health and safety test as laid out by the Supreme
Court in Ref re AHRA cannot be fully sustained.177
Moreover as Justices Le Bel and Deschamps opined not all
public health risks should be addressed through criminal
law.”178 It is worth considering whether the medical testing
of surrogates, including those who use their own ova in
their surrogate pregnancy, more appropriately falls within
the scope of provincial health responsibilities. Certainly,
if the more pressing justification warranting mandatory
medical and genetic screening and testing is that of concern
of transmission of genetic disease it follows that the
government should have taken measures to ensure that all
surrogates are screened and tested and that a pan-Canadian
third-party donor registry established.
It is tempting to argue that the imposition of
mandatory screening and testing of ova obtained from a
176
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donor and used in her surrogate pregnancy was a misplaced
attempt to suppress the “moral evil” of traditional
surrogacy though in this case through the guise of a “health
and safety evil”. If this is the case, then subsection 10(2)(c)
functions as a backdoor means of marginalizing and
discouraging the practice of traditional surrogacy enabled
by assisted reproductive methods as the imposition of
mandatory screening and testing procedures may serve to
discourage the practice. For example, not all clinics have
the expertise or ability to follow the procedures required to
test and screen ova as was the case when the federal semen
regulations were adopted in 1996.179 The Designated
Donor option as described in the 2017 CAN/CSA Standard
and 2018 proposed Safety of Sperm and Ova Regulations
will assist to decrease the ova screening and testing burden
in cases where the traditional surrogate is known to
intended parents. Even so, not all traditional surrogates will
qualify as Designated Donors though the requirements of
the type of qualifying relationship needed have not been
fully described.180
More troubling, however, is the potential for
confusion created by the blurring of roles as the traditional
surrogate is the recipient of her own ova. Precise clinic
practice guidelines need to be in place so that traditional
surrogates retain the ability to exercise control over
“obtained” ova. Application of the AHRA Section 8
(Consent) Regulations needs to be significantly robust to
ensure that the act of “obtaining” the patient’s ova will not
179
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interfere with the ability of the “donor” to determine its
reproductive use, be this in her own pregnancy, a surrogate
pregnancy, or by a third-party. The surrogate’s ova can also
be donated for research or training.
Another source of confusion originates from the
failure to regard surrogates as “fertility patients”. The
traditional surrogate who will be the recipient of an embryo
comprised of her ovum and sperm donated by the intended
father or some other third-party has not be been regarded
as a “fertility patient” as this term is reserved by fertility
clinics for the intended parents as it is this party who
experiences infertility.181 As the Chonn incident reveals the
liminal legal status the traditional surrogate assumes by
agreeing to undergo ovarian stimulation to obtain ova blurs
the lines of fertility patient, third-party donor, and
reproductive ova user. This mutable status has the potential
to create confusion for the clinic tasked with delivering
fertility treatments and to foster misunderstanding among
all of the parties involved.
The amended 2012 AHRA at subsection 10(2)(c)
seeks to discourage and criminalize the use of unscreened
and tested ova obtained from a traditional surrogate and
used in her own surrogate pregnancy. This measure
harkens back to the Baird Commission’s 1993 report,
which stated that “surrogacy of any sort is exploitative and
unacceptable.”182
The Baird Commission which
recommended the prohibition of surrogacy sought “to
prevent psychological harm to the surrogate who may bond
181
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with her unborn child and to save women from the ‘evil’ of
surrogacy.”183 A subsequent Parliamentary Committee
report, Building Families, written as part of a review
undertaken of the proposed 2004 Assisted Human
Reproduction legislation expressed the view that “noncommercial (altruistic) surrogacy arrangements can also be
socially harmful for the resulting child and place the health
of women at risk.”184 Even though the Commissioners
agreed with the proposed prohibition of surrogacy for
commercial gain, they stated nonetheless that “surrogacy
for non-commercial reasons should be discouraged but not
criminalized.”185
This paper has advanced the argument that the
rationale for mandating criminal code powers requiring
screening and testing of a traditional surrogate’s ova is
based on a tenuous health and safety rationale. The
potential for transmission of genetic disease is a stronger
justification though the AHRA at subsection 10(2) c) does
not require screening and testing for all traditional
surrogates with the result that its application to a small set
of cases suggests a disproportionate use of criminal code
powers. The real “evil” in this arrangement is not one of
health and safety but that of the use of criminal law powers
to constrain the practice of traditional surrogacy, a legally
permissible activity when conducted in a non-commercial
manner.186 An analogy to this situation can be found in a
recent American anti-abortion legislation, Texas HB2,
183
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which was proposed as a patient health and safety
protection measure, but which would have seriously
transformed the ability of women to access abortion
services had it been approved.187
Canada’s assisted human reproduction legislation
is deeply flawed. Piecemeal amendments and regulatory
tinkering serve to further confuse Canada’s fertility law.
The federal government’s application of a health and safety
justification to support criminal code penalties for failure
to screen and test ovum obtained from a woman and used
in her own surrogate pregnancy is tenuous. More
dangerous, however, are the underlying implications for
consent and reproductive autonomy of a traditional
surrogate undergoing IVF treatments and the dangerous
legal liminal spaces it creates. The on-going lack of a panCanadian donor registry weakens further the health and
safety justification for a legally mandated medical and
genetic history data collection from this subset of
traditional surrogates. Failure to tackle these matters is the
true “evil” that needs to be addressed.
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